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ABSTRACT 
In the quarter-century that SLS has been published, regulation has emerged as a new, and for 
many exciting, inter-disciplinary field. The concept itself requires a wider view of 
normativity than the narrow positivist one of law as command. It is certainly protean, ranging 
over many fundamental questions about the changing nature of the public sphere of politics 
and the state, and its interactions with the ‘private’ sphere of economic activity and social 
relations, as well as the mediation of these interactions, especially through law. This survey 
aims to outline and evaluate some of the main contours of the field as it has developed in this 
recent period, focusing on the regulation of economic activity. Regulation is seen as having 
emerged with the withdrawal by governments from direct provision of many economic and 
social services, to be replaced by corporatist bureaucracies and quasi-public agencies 
managing the complex public-private interactions of financialised capitalism. The arguments 
for ‘smart’ regulation have, in an era fixated on neo-liberalism, generally legitimised 
delegation of responsibility to big business. Its advocates, having been drawn into policy 
fields, have perhaps too often lost their critical edge, and allowed it to become 
instrumentalised, reflecting the technicist character of its practice. 
1. ORIGINS AND APPROACHES 
The recent concern with regulation emerged in the 1970s, as a field of political battle as much 
as scholarship. The first issue of Regulation. AEI Journal on Government and Society, 
published by the Cato Institute, aimed to address the ‘extraordinary growth in the scope and 
detail of government regulation ... one of the two or three most significant political facts of 
our times’ (Brunsdale, 1977: 2). A paper in the same issue by Irving Kristol, while 
recognising the need for regulation and even for its increase in a complex society, attacked 
the 'new class' who in his view benefited from powerful government, naming them as 
Naderites, with career jobs in US agencies such as EPA or OSHA (Kristol, 1977).  
This critique drew on the economistic analysis of the politics of regulation by Stigler, who 
argued that ‘as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry, and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit’ (Stigler, 1971: 3). Although in some ways similar to analyses of 
regulatory ‘capture’ more familiar in socio-legal studies, this perspective challenged the need 
for regulation, while more left-wing approaches tended to take that necessity for granted, 
seeing ‘capture’ as diverting public purposes to private ends. The right-libertarian critique of 
the arguments for government action targeted the weaknesses of the assumptions for such 
action in classical welfare economics, and saw capture as intrinsic to state action. 
Far from being tamed, and despite the dominance of neo-liberal ideas since the 1970s, 
regulation has continued to expand. Nevertheless, the battles continue today, as one of the 
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first actions of the Trump administration was to slash the budgets of these same agencies. 
Once the Reagan-Thatcher era was under way, the field became more mainstream, for 
example with the foundation of the Yale Journal of Regulation in 1983. In the US, of course, 
it became dominated by the law and economics perspective, which saw regulation as 
government ‘intervention’ in market transactions, justified only by ‘market failures’, due to 
‘bounded rationality’, ‘information asymmetry’, or where the costs of market transactions 
exceeded those resulting from government action. 
In parallel, a very different approach led to the formation of a ‘regulation school’, based in 
France, which later established its own Revue de la Régulation.
1
 It resulted from the seminal 
Marxist revisionist work of Michel Aglietta (Aglietta 1976/1979), building on the concepts of 
social reproduction and regimes of accumulation. Although this perspective was also focused 
on the economic, it was a very different one from that of law and economics, as it stemmed 
from political economy and economic sociology. Also, it was concerned with bringing 
broader social science perspectives into economics, while the economic analysis of law led to 
mutually reinforcing formalisms (Campbell and Picciotto, 1998). While law-and-economics 
considered regulation to be an external political intrusion into economic activity, seen 
essentially as consisting of natural processes of market exchange, the French regulation 
school viewed the economic sphere as part of the ensemble of broader social relations.  
Despite their differences, the two approaches had some commonalities. In particular, they 
both pointed to the need for analysis of the role of law and institutions in economic activity. 
They can also be seen to have emerged in response to structural social and economic changes, 
following the end of the thirty-year period of post-war capitalist growth in the crisis of 1973-
4. The impact of these changes varied in different countries, largely due to the differences in 
their historical patterns. In the USA, state involvement in the economy had long taken the 
form of regulatory agencies, dating back to the emergence of large-scale corporations in the 
progressive era of the early 20
th
 century, extended in the New Deal of the 1930s. Hence, there 
the debate concerned the extent and form of regulation by state agencies (e.g. Bardach and 
Kagan 1982; Noll, 1985). 
In contrast, other capitalist countries developed a ‘mixed economy’, with more direct 
governmental involvement, through state ownership of infrastructure industries, as well as of 
other socio-economic activities regarded as necessary for public welfare, such as 
broadcasting, and health-care. Some countries went further, and attempted various forms of 
central planning of the economy, while of course state ownership and central planning were 
systemic in the soviet bloc. In these countries, the battle-ground in the 1980s and 1990s was 
privatisation, and the defenders of welfare states and public provision at first generally 
viewed regulation with suspicion. This suspicion was sometimes shared by neo-liberal 
promoters of privatisation, some of whom took the rhetoric of free markets seriously, 
adopting market fundamentalism and deregulation, for example in New Zealand (Kelsey 
1995). The fixation on the illusory notion of ‘free markets’ by both the advocates and 
opponents of neo-liberalism perhaps helps to explain why the ‘regulation school’ did not 
spread much beyond France, and why interest in the study of regulation took longer to 
emerge outside the USA.
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However, by the early 1990s leading advocates of privatisation and liberalisation also 
accepted the need for ‘good governance’, involving appropriate legal and regulatory 
frameworks for economic development. Notably, after a decade of structural adjustment 
policies undermining public provision in developing countries, in 1989 the World Bank 
identified a `crisis of governance’ in sub-Saharan Africa, then published a more general 
report on Governance and Development in 1992, culminating in the 1997 World 
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Development Report, The State in a Changing World. This was deftly analysed in this journal 
by Lawrence Tshuma, who showed how, just as the Bank’s earlier attack on public provision 
by states was powered by public choice theories, its ‘governance turn’ was underpinned by 
institutional economics (Tshuma, 1999). He went on to dissect the similar volte-face of the 
International Monetary Fund following the financial crises of the mid-1990s, switching from 
fervent advocacy of liberalisation to concern with the reform of the ‘international financial 
architecture’, and he also explored the tensions in the new paradigm of international 
regulatory networks (Tshuma, 2000).
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In the year this journal was founded was published Responsive Regulation by Ian Ayres, a 
product of Yale (like others who contributed to the field, notably Susan Rose-Ackermann), 
and John Braithwaite, an Australian criminologist and philosophical republican, whose 
previous work on corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry had led him to research into 
more effective modes of regulation (Braithwaite, 1993). This reflected the sociological turn in 
criminology, which had led to a concern with governance, seen in the UK in the work of W. 
G. Carson and others (Brannigan and Pavlich, 2007). An insightful and carefully empirical 
paper by John and Valerie Braithwaite on rules and standards in nursing home regulation was 
published in this journal (Braithwaite and Braithwaite, 1995). They went on to found the 
Regulatory Institutions Network (RegNet) at the Australian National University in 2000, and 
a recent edited collection testifies to the wide-ranging applications and continuing debates it 
fostered (Drahos 2017).  
Ayres and Braithwaite aimed to ‘transcend the deregulation debate’, and their book proved 
seminal. It argued that regulation, especially of business and economic activity, should not be 
a top-down system of command and control, but should be viewed as an interactive process, 
involving both firms themselves and civil society actors, with the `big stick’ of the state being 
a last resort. The interplay between state and private ordering should be responsive to 
industry structure, and attuned to the motives of the different actors. The state could promote 
private regulation through ‘enlightened delegation’ of regulatory functions to public interest 
groups, to unregulated competitors, and even to regulated firms themselves, but this should 
be neither wholesale nor unconditional. The best government strategy should be negotiated 
self-regulation, agreeing goals while leaving the attainment of them to industry, but making it 
clear that socially suboptimal compliance would lead to escalation up the ‘enforcement 
pyramid’ of intervention, a trope formulated by Braithwaite, which has been central to his 
work. It built on the work of Hawkins and others, which showed that those responsible for 
enforcing law generally begin with persuasion and negotiation, and view prosecution as a last 
resort, used against those considered recalcitrant (Silbey, 1984; Hawkins, 1984; Hawkins, 
2002). Hence, it fed into the ‘common sense’ of regulators, although it was also underpinned 
by Braithwaite’s civic republicanism (Mascini, 2013: 55). 
The book also drew on the work of Nonet and Selznick at Berkeley on the emergence of 
‘responsive law’, as an evolution from ‘repressive’ and ‘autonomous’ legal orders, and in 
response to the crisis of legal formalism characteristic of autonomous law (Nonet and 
Selznick, 1978). A variation of this, ‘reflexive law’, was developed by Guenther Teubner, 
melding the ideas from Berkeley with German sociological influences from Habermas and 
Luhmann, in the stimulating atmosphere of the socio-legal school at Bremen (Teubner, 
1983). Braithwaite later acknowledged the affinity: while rejecting the view of autopoeisis 
that regards law and business systems as ‘normatively closed and cognitively open’, he 
accepted the relevance of Teubner’s ‘regulatory trilemma’ (Braithwaite, 2006: 885). 
This means that: either law, politics and/or the social area of life will be mutually 
indifferent, or juridification will have disintegrating effects on politics and/or social 
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sectors concerned, or, finally, law itself will be exposed to the disintegrating pressures 
to conform of politics and/or social sectors (Teubner, 1987: 27). 
Braithwaite articulated the trilemma as follows: 
‘[a] law that goes against the grain of business culture risks irrelevance; a law that 
crushes normative systems that naturally emerge in business can destroy virtue; a law 
that lets business norms take it over can destroy its own virtues’ (Braithwaite 2006, 
885). 
This approach to regulation was inherently multi-disciplinary, going beyond the tentative 
explorations of issues such as enforcement discretion, notably in British public law (e.g. 
Hawkins, 1992). However, the mushrooming growth of regulatory agencies especially in the 
UK following extensive privatisations, brought more public lawyers to study the 
phenomenon. For some this involved devising a common law equivalent to German 
Wirtschaftsverwaltungsrecht, or French droit public économique (Ogus, 1994),
4
 while also 
bringing a constitutionalist perspective (e.g. Prosser, 2010). Such work also transcended 
disciplinary boundaries, drawing on the politics of government relations to big business 
(Hancher and Moran, 1989), and then on new approaches to accounting concerned with the 
management of risk, explored at the Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation at the LSE 
(Baldwin, 1990, 1997; Power, 1997). There, Julia Black in particular introduced the concepts 
of ‘decentring’ (Black, 2001), and of ‘regulatory conversations’ (Black, 2002). The field of 
regulation could also draw from legal pluralism, since regulatory regimes often entail a 
variety of normative forms of ‘soft law’ as well as formal ‘hard law’. Deriving some of its 
rootstock from criminology also perhaps explains the breadth of issues to which it has been 
applied, many primarily social rather than economic, such as health-care and peace-building. 
However, in this survey we are primarily interested in approaches to the regulation of 
economic and business activity. 
The emergence of these ideas and approaches reflected the enormous growth since the 1980s 
of new forms of social and economic control and coordination, which generally filled the gap 
left by the retreat of governments from direct management of economic activity. These have 
been described by some as a new `regulatory state’ (Majone 1993, Loughlin and Scott, 1997; 
Braithwaite, 2000; Moran, 2003), and even `regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur and Jordana, 
2005; Braithwaite, 2008); although the term ‘regulatory governance’ is perhaps more in 
vogue. The phenomenon has also been described from a more critical perspective in terms of 
changes in ‘governmentality’ (Rose and Miller, 1992). Drawing on Foucaultian notions 
which see power as diffuse rather than concentrated in ‘the state’, this perspective could 
perhaps more easily grasp the changes in the character of political power, although it has also 
resulted in eclecticism.
5
 From the viewpoint of political economy, the new entanglements and 
‘public-private-partnerships’ between big business and public bureaucracies could be better 
described as the latest phase of corporatist capitalism (Picciotto, 2011a). 
It is not surprising that Social & Legal Studies, as a generalist socio-legal journal with a 
critical social science perspective, should have published only a scattering of papers dealing 
with regulation, although they have covered many of the key issues in the field. In the next 
sections we will survey these issues, drawing on work published both in SLS and elsewhere. 
2. CHANGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FORMS AND INTERACTIONS 
Some critics have argued forcefully that the theories of regulation have overlooked the need 
for state action to curb the essential amorality of profit-oriented corporations; without such 
action, ‘as the historical record demonstrates, the result is the wide-scale production of death, 
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injury and illness, destruction and despoliation, not to mention systematic cheating, lying and 
stealing’ (Tombs, 2002: 114).  
From this perspective, Steve Tombs and David Whyte have analysed the experience of 
occupational health and safety in the UK (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). This is a paradigm case 
for responsive regulation: in 1974 the Health and Safety at Work Act replaced the rigid 
prescriptive rules of the Factory Acts, dating back to the 19
th
 century, with the broad principle 
of a duty on employers to do all that is ‘reasonably practicable’ to ensure the health, safety, 
and welfare of employees. The detailed content of this formal legal obligation was to be 
specified in a range of context-specific codes, formulated in consultation with worker 
representatives in industries and workplaces. Aiming to show the reality of this regime in 
practice, Tombs and Whyte trace the shift from the emphasis on deregulation under 
Conservative governments after 1979 to ‘better regulation’ under the 1997 Labour 
government and then ‘light touch’ regulation in Labour’s second phase. They show that the 
Hampton report of 2005, which approvingly cited Ayres and Braithwaite, was used to justify 
the prior policy decision to adopt a strategy of cooperative relationships and risk-based 
targeted enforcement. This led to a steep decline in both prosecutions and inspections, which 
they argue was self-defeating, since the reduction of inspections deprived the authorities of 
the intelligence essential to targeting interventions (Tombs and Whyte, 2013: 13). However, 
they do not present evidence of the outcomes of the new regulatory approach, although its 
impact would be hard to evaluate in view of the enormous changes in the nature of 
workplaces. Nevertheless, it is hard to envisage the safety of the complex work-places of 
today being governed by prescriptive statutory rules. Their criticism seems directed at the 
laxity of enforcement rather than the form of regulation adopted. 
Conversely, there have been dramatic failures of public or state regulation. A notable case, 
examined by David Campbell and Bob Lee, was the foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak 
in the UK in 2001, which resulted in large-scale slaughter of over ten million animals at a 
direct cost of £9b (Campbell and Lee, 2003). They show how the pandemic was the 
inevitable result of regulatory decisions: the abandonment of prophylactic vaccination, the 
consequent reliance on ‘stamping out’ outbreaks by slaughter, the encouragement of rearing 
practices involving extensive live animal movements, and the completely bungled response to 
the 2001 outbreak, which began with tardy and ineffective identification and isolation of the 
disease, then accelerated into a national emergency and the deployment of military force. The 
escalation from cull to carnage could be seen as a parody of Braithwaite’s enforcement 
pyramid, culminating in the deployment of a very big stick indeed. However, the fundamental 
cause to which they point was the inability of the bureaucrats in the ministry of agriculture to 
understand the realities on the ground of the industry they so closely regulated.  
More specifically, they criticise the failure of any public body to evaluate alternatives to the 
slaughter policy, especially that of official inaction. Although highly contagious, FMD is not 
normally fatal to animals (though it affects their productivity), is not transmitted to humans, 
and vaccination is available. The slaughter policy resulted from the view, later articulated by 
one expert, that capacity was not available to carry out a full evaluation of alternative disease 
control methods, and consequently that control should be a collective rather than an 
individual responsibility (Campbell and Lee, 2003: 448-449). Campbell and Lee reiterate the 
powerful arguments of Ronald Coase, challenging the justifications for state action in Pigou’s 
welfare economics, which assumed the need for public action to be inherent in certain types 
of activity, regardless of empirical evidence. These assumptions persist today in debates 
about activities such as water supply, which are often conducted in terms of the instinctive 
feelings of the participants either that they should be ‘public’, or that they would be better 
managed by ‘private’ business. Campbell and Lee also recall that Coase expressed his 
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critique as an attack on ‘blackboard economics’, and that his approach drew attention 
particularly to the legal and institutional framework. 
There are two additional important aspects to this analysis, which also underlie the shift to the 
regulatory state. One is that legal rules can be designed to ensure that the costs of activities 
are borne by those who can most appropriately bear them. The other is the critique of 
bureaucratic rationality, as opposed to dispersed decision-making, characterised in economic 
terms as ‘the market’. A policy of inaction towards FMD would leave it to farmers to decide 
whether to adopt vaccination, and to weigh the costs of prevention against the impact of the 
disease on productivity, and perhaps also on the welfare of the animals in their charge. 
However, Campbell and Lee seem to accept that public authorities should protect outcomes 
which private interests would otherwise neglect.  
Indeed, defining the appropriate roles for public authorities and for private actors, and 
ensuring their fruitful interaction, has been central to much work on regulation. A common 
pattern has been for public authorities to abandon prescriptive rules, in favour of specifying 
desirable outcomes while leaving the methods for attaining them to private actors. Such 
performance- and process-oriented regulatory regimes have emerged especially in sectors 
dominated by large corporations, not least because they control the complex technologies 
involved. Such regimes have been studied by researchers, often in the context of dramatic 
regulatory failures. A notable example is deep-sea oil and gas drilling, dramatised by the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill of 2010. The causes were a series of mistaken 
engineering decisions by BP and its contractors (Transocean and Halliburton), partly 
attributable to cost-saving. These took place following the shift to a process-oriented 
regulatory system, with one regulator characterising the relationship to the offshore industry 
as ‘more a partner than a policeman’ (Mills and Koliba, 2015: 83). From the viewpoint of 
regulatory theory, the issue can be analysed in terms of the design of lines of accountability 
and their interactions, with this case demonstrating the dominance of shareholder as against 
consumer, administrative/professional or democratic accountability (ibid.).  
Another recent example of the limitations of process- or performance-based regulation is 
diesel pollution emission standards. This was revealed by the admission in 2015 by 
Volkswagen, the world’s largest auto manufacturer, that for seven years it had been selling 
cars that satisfied the legal standards only under laboratory conditions, while vastly 
exceeding them in real life on the road, due to the deliberate installation of a defeat device. 
The failure was revealed by a small civil society organisation, paying for tests from its own 
budget, which was less than 1% of the EPA’s. It is not clear that the use of the defeat 
software was illegal, since the engines complied with the prescribed tests, so the prosecution 
of Volkswagen was settled by a $15b payment. The EPA’s regulatory framework was clearly 
defective, having failed to require the use of on-road testing methods, despite their 
availability, and despite a previous experience of the same type of evasion by heavy-duty 
diesel manufacturers (Coglianese and Nash, 2017). It has subsequently become apparent that 
other firms were also involved in such practices. 
These examples show, at a minimum, that new approaches to regulation have been adopted 
enthusiastically by governments in a context of cuts in public expenditures. Also, regulatory 
theorists, perhaps seduced by their influence on public policy, have preferred to emphasise 
the advantages of cooperation rather than to advise guarding against its pitfalls. Even for 
advocates of new forms of regulation, there is clearly an important role for regulators. 
Braithwaite’s theory of ‘pyramid’ enforcement recognised this, although the concept of the 
‘big stick’ clearly needed refinement, and empirical studies have pointed to various problems 
and limitations (Mascini, 2013: 50-53). Instead, the role of public regulators has been 
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attenuated to that of enabling corporate self-regulation, while attempting to inculcate 
responsibility in corporate decision-making and action, through what has been described as 
‘meta-regulation’ (overarching regulatory standards for regulation) (Parker, 2002: 29). 
For both deep-water drilling and diesel emissions, there was not inaction or abstention from 
regulation by the state, leaving the problem purely to ‘market’ processes, as Campbell and 
Lee suggested should have been considered for FMD control. Nevertheless, process-oriented 
regulation delegated substantial responsibility to the corporations in the industry concerned, 
although backed by legal sanctions. The considerable social and environmental damage 
caused by their failures also inflicted enormous economic costs on the corporations 
themselves. These included both private civil liabilities from tort claims by those directly 
harmed, and public penalties resulting from criminal prosecution, as well as the government 
imposition of a compensation and clean-up regime (in the case of BP). That neither BP nor 
Volkswagen was bankrupted by the billions in liabilities they incurred was due to their giant 
size and concomitant profitability. This was also the reason for their ability to invest in the 
complex technologies involved, and master them beyond the capacity of a public regulator to 
comprehend adequately.  
This suggests that key elements in a regulatory system are the rules on legal liability for 
harm, and those governing the corporate form. If liability rules are suitably designed, then it 
may be appropriate that those involved in a potentially dangerous activity should have the 
primary responsibility of managing it safely, as well as bearing the costs. However, the 
corporate form clearly creates much stronger incentives for directors and managers to 
maximise profits for shareholders than to consider the wider and longer-term responsibilities 
of the business. 
The regulatory failure which has had the widest repercussions has of course been the great 
financial crash. The emergence of a complex system of transnational financial regulation 
began with the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system system, due largely 
to the exploitation by transnational corporations and banks of partial financial liberalisation to 
undermine the national controls on which it rested. The moves by US banks to set up 
branches ‘offshore’ (including in London) also escaped national regulation such as the 
separation of investment and retail banking. The resulting extensive liberalisation since the 
1970s opened up markets, but also resulted in more far more formalised rules (Vogel, 1996).  
This was not a smooth process, but a conflictual and often chaotic one, with new forms of 
regulation being introduced and then reformed, often reacting to failures. Indeed, the period 
from 1973 saw a series of financial and especially banking crises, in sharp contrast to the 
previous era of national monetary management and bank supervision, when there were none 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009, pp. 204-8). In reaction to successive dramas and crises, informal 
oversight by central banks and finance ministries was replaced with a proliferation of 
regulatory commissions and agencies and a massive expansion of their rulebooks. 
Financialised capitalism has also been characterised by frenetic innovation in complex 
instruments and transactions, largely in symbiotic relationship with the formal rules, due to 
regulatory arbitrage and avoidance. 
Hence, contrary to many conventional accounts, finance has become highly regulated 
nationally and internationally, but in forms favouring private or quasi-public self-regulation. 
Crucially, these forms of regulation took for granted the structural underpinnings of the 
markets and the factors which led to their meteoric growth. They focused instead on 
measures aiming to ensure the soundness of the participants, which in practice gave these 
actors the support and indeed the stimulus to turn finance into a self-sustaining sphere of 
circulation and speculation.  
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Much of the regulation has been done by private industry bodies: exchanges, clearing houses, 
credit rating agencies (CRAs), and private associations such as the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). A key role was played in particular by the CRAs, such as 
Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, which evaluate financial instruments and the 
creditworthiness of their issuers, both firms and governments (Sinclair, 2005). These 
agencies, although private and profit-making companies, were in practice given an official 
status, since their ratings have important regulatory consequences.
6
 Hence, they form in 
effect a state-backed oligopoly. However, their private interest in expanding the market for 
their services meant that, especially in the development of new forms of structured finance, 
they became `more like gate openers than gate-keepers’ (Partnoy, 2006: 60). Although the 
problems with their role became evident with the collapse of Enron and others in 2001-2 
(ibid.), no significant moves were made to establish tighter controls on the CRAs. Their lax 
ratings of complex securities were a major contributory factor causing the bubble in mortgage 
finance and the crisis of 2007-8 (BIS, 2009: 8-9). 
Regulation by public authorities with responsibility for stability and security of the financial 
system concentrated on allocating responsibility for supervision of entities and establishing 
prudential standards for them, mainly in the form of capital reserve requirements. This 
emerged as a process of international re-regulation through interacting regulatory networks, 
in which the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), formed in 1974, played a 
key role. Meantime, regulators generally adopted a hands-off attitude towards financial 
transactions, further encouraging the proliferation of complex forms of finance. 
However, the BCBS standards could only operate as ‘meta-regulation’, to be applied (and 
interpreted) by national regulators. Furthermore, the increasing complexity of financial 
derivatives led to a shift away from prescriptive capital requirements, so that the Basle II 
standards established ‘meta-regulation’ standards for the banks’ own internal risk models. 
The UK bank Northern Rock, which failed in September 2007, had only a few months 
previously been granted a regulatory waiver, on the grounds that its internal model had been 
adequately stress-tested. These models used the ‘Value at Risk’ concept based on the 
assumptions of efficient market theory put forward by financial economists, many of whom 
became well-remunerated advisers to financial trading firms. Although these techniques were 
criticised at the time by some, they shaped the frenetic financial trading that led to the crash 
(MacKenzie, 2006). A retrospective evaluation concluded that ‘Modern Financial Theory 
rests on unsound assumptions and should largely be ditched. Some of its main pillars ... have 
been pretty much exploded. [It] also provided guides to action so false that they perverted the 
financial markets, causing trillions of dollars in losses, and damn near brought down the 
world financial system. However, its adoption as Holy Writ served the economic self-interest 
of Wall Street and in many cases was allowed to drive out previous superior analytical 
methods' (Dowd and Hutchinson, 2010: 403).  
As is well known, the crash resulted in publicly-funded bail-outs for the banks: the costs were 
estimated to have averaged 5.2% of GDP for advanced G20 countries (IMF, 2009: Table 1). 
Participants in the banking and financial services industries had reaped enormous personal 
rewards during the boom, due in no small measure to the implicit guarantee that their 
activities would be backed by governments acting as lender-of-last-resort, which stimulated 
speculation. Yet few of them suffered significant penalties after the crash. The regulatory 
framework had enabled the finance sector largely to internalise the profits and externalise the 
costs of its activities. Although the crisis resulted in much recrimination and soul-searching, 
regulatory reforms have been half-hearted, side-lining more radical ideas such as reverting to 
mutual- and social-ownership forms for banking (Kotlikoff, 2010). 
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The examples discussed in this section are obviously egregious cases of regulatory failure, 
but they nevertheless reveal the fault-lines in actual regulatory systems, against which the 
theories can be evaluated. There clearly has been no easy transition to a ‘regulatory state’, but 
rather a disruption of pre-existing governance arrangements, played out differently in 
different countries and contexts. In the UK for example, Michael Moran has analysed the 
shift from closed communities of self-regulation, or ‘club rule’, to the formalisation and 
codification of regulation, resulting in what he describes as a roller-coaster ride of hyper-
innovation and policy disasters, `from stagnation to fiasco’ (Moran, 2003: 155ff). Further, 
Peter Vincent-Jones has studied the new forms of public service management, analysing them 
as a process of contractualisation (Vincent-Jones, 2006). 
While public structures have been disrupted and in some respects ‘privatised’, private 
institutional and legal forms have proved ill-suited to managing the wider social 
responsibilities which decentred regulation requires them to accept. The corporate legal form 
in particular has remained an essentially private one, despite much talk of wider 
accountability to ‘stakeholders’ as well as shareholders, and of ‘corporate social 
responsibility’. The growth of formalised regulation has also exacerbated the tensions in 
private law: between contract as a discrete individual bargain and as a planning tool (Collins, 
1999), and in the law of torts or obligations, between the regulatory and redress models 
(Goldberg, 2012). Scholars have addressed the relationship between regulation and these 
private law forms (Parker et al., 2004), but there remains uncertainty about what it would 
mean for private law to become more ‘regulatory’, and whether it could do so without losing 
its original and perhaps primary role. Vincent-Jones has offered a classification of the new 
forms of administrative contracts, and suggested ways in which they could provide effective 
governance structures through more effective reflexivity and democratic experimentalism 
(Vincent-Jones, 2007). However, Campbell argues that these ‘social control contracts’ are a 
misuse of the concept of voluntary agreement, and that the experimentalism is rather a 
stumbling from one failure to another (Campbell, 2007). 
Indeed, it can be said that the rapid expansion of regulation itself results from the 
unsuitability of inherited legal and institutional forms, generally based on the private rights of 
individuals, for forms of economic activity which now take a large social scale and have 
extensive social and environmental impacts. Perhaps the starkest example of this is 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), which have developed historically as proprietary rights to 
exclude others from using assets. This private property concept has been continually 
strengthened, notably by extending copyright protection to utilitarian works such as software, 
and extending its duration, even though it is now highly inappropriate to an increasingly 
knowledge-based economy. Although there has been some counterbalancing growth of 
concepts of fair use and the public domain, there has been a significant expansion of the 
scope of IP protection, due to lobbying by corporate interests, supported by weak theoretical 
justifications. Amazingly, the expansion of IPRs has been advocated by ‘free market’ 
ideologues, contradicting their usual opposition to state intervention. Notably R.A. Posner, 
despite being a fierce opponent of state intervention either to provide ‘public goods’ or 
restrict competition, has supported the expansion of IP as an ‘excludable public good’, 
concealing the reality that it is a grant of monopoly rights delivering those public goods into 
private hands (Campbell and Picciotto, 2006: 443). The need to manage the tensions between 
private IPRs and the realities of the ‘sharing economy’ has led to an enormous growth of 
regulatory arrangements governing matters ranging from copyright licensing to access to 
plant genetic resources (Picciotto, 2011a: chapter 9).  
Hence, a better design of traditional legal forms, especially those involving property rights, 
could reduce the need for extensive regulation (Picciotto, 2011b). Central to this is the 
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corporation, which is still considered as a form of private property owned by its shareholders. 
This protects senior executives and managers of oligopolistic firms from the downside risk of 
their decisions, while allowing them to appropriate, through share options and bonuses, a 
major share of the super-profits generated by the extensive social scale of their operations. 
The central justification for the complex and highly regulated public-private ‘partnership’ 
arrangements which now dominate the economy is that the ‘private’ sector is better able to 
manage risk, and this should be highly rewarded. The reality is that the large corporation is a 
cash-cow which can absorb large losses, with government as an ever-ready backstop, but in 
any event the worse that happens to its top executives is that they depart taking a significant 
slice of its capital, while faithful lower-level managers will generally be protected, although a 
few renegades and whistleblowers will be sacrificed.
7
  
3. EXPERTISE, POLITICS AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
A central feature of the ‘regulatory state’ is the delegation of public functions to agencies 
with considerable autonomy from central government, or ‘non-majoritarian regulators’ (Coen 
and Thatcher, 2005). This can be understood as an attempt to prevent ‘state capture’ by 
insulating decisions from the influence of politicians, and hence ensure that they are taken on 
their merits, ensuring stability and fairness for economic competition. Indeed, it is often 
politicians themselves who prefer to take a distance, and establish expert bodies to manage 
complex or conflictual issues on the basis of science or objective evidence. Together with the 
need for specialist knowledge, the role of technical experts is clearly central to regulation. 
However, it poses fundamental issues of both effectiveness and legitimacy, which are in 
many ways linked.  
A major limitation of bureaucratic rationality is its reliance on abstractions and calculations, 
so that decisions are remote from the lived experience of those affected (illustrated by the 
FMD case discussed in the previous section). There is also awareness that the targets of 
regulation can adapt their behaviour, often in unpredictable ways, perhaps to defeat its aims – 
regulatory avoidance or evasion. The emphasis in regulatory theory on reflexivity, rather than 
command, attempts to overcome these problems, by suggesting a cooperative approach to 
both the formulation and the enforcement of rules. The primary concern of regulators is likely 
to be to ensure effectiveness, so that they prioritise consultation with the targets or subjects of 
regulation, to identify possible responses and hence improve compliance. However, this again 
courts the danger of capture, which could obviously compromise the wider social goals, and 
undermine the legitimacy of the regulatory regime.  
Hence, regulatory systems face a fundamental dilemma. Their reason for existence is to 
provide expert decision-making insulated from politics and special interests, but this 
undermines democracy and raises the problem of legitimacy.  
One response is to rely frankly on the authority of expertise and specialised knowledge. This 
has been justified on the grounds that the issues dealt with are non-political, since they do not 
affect income redistribution, but aim merely to achieve economic efficiency, an argument 
especially relevant to the European Union (Majone, 1999). More recently, commentators 
have more frankly accepted that reliance on technocracy is essentially paternalist (Barnett, 
2016). A variant has had significant influence as ‘nudge’ policy under the ‘third way’ politics 
of Blair and Obama, resulting from the collaboration between the behavioural economist 
Richard Thaler and the public lawyer Cass Sunstein (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). While they 
call this ‘libertarian paternalism’, it has been described as manipulative elitism (Campbell, 
2017). However, Sunstein’s earlier work had criticised narrow technicist approaches such as 
cost-benefit analysis, and argued for greater space for democratic input into regulatory 
decisions (Pildes and Sunstein, 1995). He has also criticised the negative conception of 
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freedom he describes as consumer sovereignty and supported ‘a deliberative over an interest-
group pluralist, or populist-majoritarian, or (unmentioned) Schumpeterian-elitist conception 
of democracy' (Michelman, 2002, reviewing Sunstein, 2001). 
More frequently, regulatory theorists have explored ways of remedying the democratic deficit 
of the regulatory state, with some support from practitioners, mainly by calling for 
accountability and transparency. However, these principles remain ill-defined, and contests 
over the form they take become part of the repoliticisation of regulation. Unsurprisingly, the 
subjects of regulation generally prefer to deal with regulators directly, preferably in private or 
‘backstage’ (Reichman, 1992). Regulators also find this easier, not least because such 
discussions can often be conducted in a common technical language. Hence, most forms of 
consultation are aimed primarily or only at those affected, unless campaigners make enough 
impact to oblige politicians and officials to cast a wider net. More extensive consultation 
inevitably brings in different perspectives and considerations. For example, Fiona Haines has 
shown how consulting local communities about the risks posed by hazardous industries 
introduces a different perception of risk, obliging the regulated firms ‘to take on a more 
explicitly political role that required balancing assurances about socio-cultural and actuarial 
risk management while also dealing with economic pressures aimed at increasing profit’ 
(Haines, 2009: 411). 
A more direct critique of technocratic decision-making has come from those who have drawn 
on the social studies of science and technology, derived especially from Bruno Latour. For 
example, Donatella Alessandrini deploys a range of examples to show that the debates on 
regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) such as seeds and crops cannot be 
resolved by appeals to ‘nature’ or ‘sound science’, as if they were the realm of facts distinct 
from values, since scientific knowledge entails contested practices attempting to resolve 
uncertainties, often involving diverse scientific disciplines (Alessandrini, 2010). This 
suggests that democratising regulation must go beyond calls for wider participation in 
advisory committees, and requires involvement in the technical debates themselves of a 
variety of specialists, in this case not only microbiologists and ecologists, but including 
‘farmers, activists, environmentalists, economists, philosophers and social scientists’ (ibid.: 
19).  
Further, some philosophers have argued that for such debates to be fruitful requires a shift 
from an objectivist to a democratic concept of rationality, based on a deliberative interaction 
between different specialisms and perspectives, and awareness by specialists of the 
conditional or contingent nature of their expert knowledge and judgements (Dryzek, 1990; 
Wynne, 1992). This is very difficult to inculcate in practice, since professional competition 
encourages experts to make strong claims, and to rely on formalism and technicism (taking 
their specialist part for the whole), creating epistemological closure which excludes reflexive 
dialogue with others. 
Legal expertise, of course, also figures in these interactions. One role is the routinisation of 
transactions in the face of technical uncertainty. For example, Riles’s rich ethnographic study 
of lawyers devising contracts for collateralisation of financial derivatives shows not only how 
they help to create markets in such transactions through ‘theoretical and doctrinal 
maneuvers’, but also how they regularise trading transactions through the routine back-office 
work (Riles, 2010: 798, 801). She stresses that these lawyers were ‘painfully aware of the 
limits of their own expertise’ (ibid.: 800), yet the collateral contracts they devised aimed to 
provide sufficient stability of expectations needed for trading, despite the inherent 
uncertainties of both portfolio valuation and of the likely legal outcome of a default.  
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Managing regulatory interactions, especially in the processes of enforcement and compliance, 
is mediated through the legal practices of interpretation due to the indeterminacy of legal 
principles and rules. Some have seen this in terms of ‘creative compliance’, or how a 
formalist approach to legal rules can facilitate avoidance – complying with the letter while 
defeating the intended purpose of the regulations (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991: 850). Valerie 
and John Braithwaite in this journal showed how regulation of nursing homes in the US 
based on prescriptive rules and ‘tick-box’ enforcement was less effective at evaluating the 
quality of care than using general principles and monitoring compliance through the more 
qualitative and consultative approach to inspection used in Australia (Braithwaite and 
Braithwaite, 1995), though one doubts that the latter would survive government cut-backs. 
This led to suggestions that effective regulatory design should combine broad statutory 
principles with more specific subordinate bright-line rules (Braithwaite, 2002). 
Others have developed a fuller notion of ‘constructive compliance’, showing that the very 
meaning of legal rules is shaped by the interactions between regulators and regulatory 
subjects. This was pointed out in early work by Nancy Reichman (Reichman, 1992; see also 
McCahery and Picciotto, 1995; Picciotto, 2007), and explored in this journal by Bettina 
Lange in an empirical study of waste management site regulation (Lange, 1999). She showed 
how negotiation not only shaped the interpretation and application of the formal rules, but 
how ‘norms for what would be defined as compliance – in the day-to-day working practice of 
the waste treatment plant – arose out of social relationships’ (ibid.: 559). Black’s application 
of discourse analysis to ‘regulatory conversations’ is obviously very relevant here, exploring 
the relationship of language to meaning, thought, knowledge, and power (Black, 2002).  
This work extends the understanding of regulatory capture beyond the politics of lobbying 
and the ‘revolving door’ shuttling professionals between public and private spheres. Although 
there is a tension between technicism and democracy, it is not an insuperable dichotomy – 
indeed law plays a central role in framing the relationship, although the problems lie well 
beyond the capacity of law to resolve (Fisher, 2007). Knowledge is inherently social, and lay 
people are inevitably dependent on the rational authority of experts, especially in a world of 
increased technological complexity (Hardwig, 1985). Thus, governance and regulatory fields 
have become dominated by ‘epistemic communities’ of experts (Haas, 1992), which however 
become prone to consensus thinking and ‘cognitive capture’ by dominant interests.8 This 
reinforces the arguments for both the democratisation of expertise, and the strengthening of 
professional accountability norms for experts, although these can also be used to marginalise 
unorthodox or critical views. This has become evident with the increasing debates within 
scientific communities over issues such as the standards and procedures for peer review and 
for the publication of research results and outputs.  
4. REGULATORY NETWORKS AND MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
The character of regulatory regimes as decentred from national governments has also resulted 
from, and helped to shape, the emergence of forms of multi-level governance, resulting from 
economic globalisation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000). Indeed, the creation of the regulatory 
state could be said to have resulted from liberalisation due to the undermining of the 
hierarchical state-centred forms of national-international law, through a variety of legal 
techniques of forum-shopping, creation and exploitation of havens and ‘offshore’ 
jurisdictions, and regulatory arbitrage (Picciotto 2011a, chapter 2.3). Thus, a central 
characteristic of what some have described as the ‘post-national’ state is the haphazard 
emergence of internationalised public-private regulatory networks.  
A central feature of this landscape is the interaction between regulators. This is often seen in 
terms of regulatory competition, a ‘race to the bottom’ or (perhaps less often) to the top 
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(Vogel, 1995; Murphy, 2004) – also termed ‘markets in vice, markets in virtue’ (Braithwaite, 
2005). A paradigm case has been the regulation of international shipping. The use of flags of 
convenience undermined effective home state regulation, while eventually leading to a 
complex system of coordinated controls and inspection by port states, as well as flag state 
registration relying on private classification societies such as the American Bureau of 
Shipping and Lloyd’s (Couper et al., 1999). An ambitious multi-country study published in 
this journal found that only a weak ‘market in virtue’ had been created because of too few 
incentives, due mainly to inconsistent inspection standards (Bloor et al., 2006). A subsequent, 
equally insightful, paper found some improvement (though still a mixed picture) for ship 
safety, and none for labour standards, though significantly better compliance with 
environmental standards (on use of low-sulphur fuel). This success seemed due not to 
instrumental motives (since enforcement levels are low and financial rewards for non-
compliance high), but to a ‘normative predisposition towards compliance’ and ‘an 
undeliberated, taken for granted assumption that operators should comply’, perhaps for 
reputational reasons (Bloor et al., 2013: 187).  
It should also be borne in mind, however that, like all markets, regulatory competition exists 
within a framework of coordination, in forms such as conditional toleration of others’ 
standards, peer-review, mutual recognition of equivalence, administrative cooperation, and 
harmonisation. While such coordination may be underpinned by shared perspectives, it can 
also be backed by countervailing measures, denial of market access and non-recognition. In 
the global economy, an overarching framework has been created through treaties fostering 
liberalisation and market access for trade and investment flows. A key institution is the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO), as well as networks such as the bilateral investment 
treaties, now being negotiated on a ‘mega-regional’ scale, such as the Transpacific 
Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).  
These broad frameworks have established a form of global meta-regulation. Since they are 
essentially concerned with economic liberalisation, they act as ‘disciplines’ on national 
requirements if they can be seen as barriers to market access. The WTO in particular acts as a 
central institutional framework for the international coordination of economic regulation, 
through its wide-ranging package of agreements going well beyond trade. These effectively 
encourage the adoption of corporate self-regulation,
9
 and create requirements for a wide 
range of national measures to comply with international standards, generally developed by 
global standard-setting organisations, often dominated by experts from business and industry 
(Buthe and Mattli, 2011). Since virtually all countries are now WTO members, it acts as a 
powerful instrument for diffusion of regulatory models worldwide. In addition, the World 
Bank and the IMF have pressurised developing countries to introduce regulatory agencies 
especially following privatisation of infrastructure sectors (Dubash and Morgan, 2012). 
In addition to formal frameworks such as the WTO agreements, the growth of global 
regulatory networks and communities has itself created transmission mechanisms for the 
transplanting of regulatory regimes. Notably, in the area of competition regulation, while 
efforts to negotiate a multilateral agreement (including in the WTO) have failed, a global 
community of experts has emerged, coalescing around semi-formal associations such as 
International Competition Network formed in 2001 (Djelic and Kleiner, 2006). Needless to 
say, such communities are not homogeneous but riven with professional and political 
rivalries, although nevertheless bound together by a common commitment to the ideologies 
and techniques of the field.  
International transmission is also driven by other forces, such as labour- and consumer-based 
activism. Such movements are able to target the global supply chains of transnational 
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corporations, and forge new links between workers’ and consumers’ organisations 
(MacDonald, 2014, Eberlein et al, 2014). The Fair Trade movement developed a network of 
worldwide regulatory arrangements, involving two dozen labelling and producer 
organizations, backed by increasingly sophisticated research and social activism (Raynalds et 
al. 2007), leading also to attempts by firms such as Nestlé and Kraft to launch their own rival 
ethical brands. Forest certification systems, long studied by Errol Meidinger, provide an 
example of interactions among activists, government and industry-based regulation 
(Meidinger, 2006). 
Given all these diverse interacting forces, it is clear that the global diffusion of regulatory 
arrangements follows very different patterns. Thus, sweeping universalist theories have 
limited traction, as pointed out by Fiona Haines in her study of the reform of industrial safety 
in Thailand in the aftermath of the Kader toy factory fire (Haines, 2003). Her paper applied 
the concept of culture to outline the elements for analysing ‘regulatory character’, to map 
how ‘global rationalism’ played out in the specific context of Thai reforms. 
5. EPILOGUE: REFLECTIONS ON PRAXIS 
It is perhaps appropriate to close this retrospective survey by considering the experience of 
regulatory regimes in navigating the trilemma identified by Teubner and Braithwaite (section 
1 above), and of the role of regulatory theorists. The emergence of the phenomenon of 
regulation has also spawned an enormous growth of academic work, much of it reflecting the 
technicist character of the field itself. Instead of challenging the view of regulation as 
apolitical, and analysing it in the broader context of changes in the forms of capitalism and 
the state, research on regulation has tended to fit ‘neatly into the neoliberal program of 
finding technical solutions to policy problems, rather than rethinking the balancing of 
relations between market, state, and civil society’ (Mascini, 2013: 56). Indeed, some of those 
engaged in developing the theory of regulation have also been involved in its praxis, 
generally by contributing to government policy formulation. Theories of ‘smart regulation’ 
and the ‘nudge’ have been packaged to feed into policy debates (Campbell, 2017), meeting a 
welcome reception in a period dominated by concerns to reduce the size and role of 
governments while increasing the effectiveness of governance. Techniques such as regulatory 
impact analysis and consultation of affected parties have become ubiquitous, and embedded 
in government practice through legislation (OECD, 2002).  
This ready reception can also be attributed to the message (in Braithwaite’s words, quoted in 
section 1 above) that ‘[a] law that goes against the grain of business culture risks irrelevance; 
a law that crushes normative systems that naturally emerge in business can destroy virtue’. 
This can obviously be read as an injunction that regulation should be business-friendly, which 
has been welcome in policy circles, while also feeding the suspicion of critics of regulation, 
such as Tombs and Whyte, who argue that it fed into neo-liberal ideology (Tombs, 2017). 
Hence, it begs the question of how successfully regulation theorists have helped its 
practitioners avoid the third limb of the trilemma: `a law that lets business norms take it over 
can destroy its own virtues’ (Braithwaite 2006, 885). These questions can clearly not be 
tackled at such a high level of abstract generality, and broad-brush concepts such as the 
regulatory trilemma, as well as Braithwaite’s pyramid, are over-simplified and somewhat 
mechanistic. However, something can perhaps be learned from how the questions are posed. 
The assumption behind them seems to be that regulation (‘the law’) is an external intrusion 
into ‘business’, albeit that regulation theory aims at harmonious interaction via 
‘reflexiveness’. Yet, as can be seen from the examples discussed in this paper (and many 
others), the reality may be different.  
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Neither ‘business’ nor ‘the law’ can be said to to exist as separate spheres each with its own 
essential characteristics. On the one hand, the forms of business, and of ‘the market’, are 
actually constituted by legal rules. In particular, it is the corporate form that delineates the 
lines of accountability of company managers and employees, and dictates the priority they 
should give for example when balancing compliance with safety standards against the costs 
involved. The same applies to the judgments made by dealers in financial instruments when 
pricing client deals with knowledge of their company’s own account trading; or by firms 
engaged in derivatives trading when calculating the value at risk for the company. In such 
contexts, it is demanding a lot to expect company managers and employees, especially when 
they are incentivised by share options and bonuses, to prioritise the general interest in stable 
finance, or even the long-term health of their own firm, over its immediate profitability or 
share price. As long as the legal forms structuring business remain focused on private or 
particularistic interests, the burden of upholding public or more general concerns inevitably 
falls on regulation.  
Similarly, the law has no essential characteristics. In particular, it cannot be assumed to 
inculcate the general public interest. The example of the FMD measures discussed in section 
2 shows the danger of making such an assumption. The public authorities took it on 
themselves to ensure that the disease would not spread, and the methods they chose took little 
account of the prevalent animal husbandry practices. Yet this seems a rare example of 
regulatory over-reach by public authorities. The other cases discussed in section 2 seem more 
representative, with public regulation delegating extensive self-regulatory responsibilities to 
business. The difference may perhaps be attributable to the power of large corporations to 
project convincing mastery over the management of the technologies, such as deep-sea 
drilling or diesel emissions controls. In such contexts, it seems that it takes a major disaster to 
foster a culture of compliance. Other examples are nuclear safety following Three Mile Island 
(Rees, 1994), and the chemicals industry following Bhopal (Cassels, 1993, King and Lenox, 
2000).  
Another factor moulding legal forms has been the pressures for business-friendly regulation, 
formalised through `meta-regulation’ (mentioned in section 2). Bronwen Morgan has 
analysed how the embedding of such regulatory review mechanisms has resulted in the 
deployment into the every-day routines of governmental policymaking of narrow economic 
rationality criteria. She argues that the requirement to justify public action in terms of criteria 
such as market failure or cost-benefit analysis has meant that ‘The discourse of regulatory 
politics ... was ultimately dominated by technocratic expertise articulated on behalf of highly 
differentiated sub-groups in society, in ways that sidestepped as far as possible the expression 
of collective values’ (Morgan, 2003: 491). 
Yet, despite the continuing pleas from business interests to reduce regulation, it has generally 
continued to expand. I suggest that this tendency to hyper-regulation can be attributed to the 
friction and conflicts generated by the unsuitability of the basic legal forms which structure 
business and economic activity. Although these activities are increasingly organised on a 
wide social scale, their legal organisational forms remain essentially private. The starkest 
example is the sphere of finance, in which managers and traders have been given free rein to 
speculate with vast pools of social savings, protected by corporate limited liability, and 
backed by the guarantee of lender-of-last resort support from the state. Correction of these 
perverse incentives would render irrelevant large swathes of financial market regulations. 
Similarly, I have traced elsewhere (also in this journal) how much of the complexity of 
regulating international corporate taxation has resulted from basing it on the legal fiction of 
separate corporate personality. This has encouraged large transnational corporations to avoid 
tax by creating complex corporate group structures that exploit the indeterminacy of abstract 
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concepts of income and residence. The anti-avoidance rules developed in response have 
become ever more elaborate, although formulated and applied by a closed community of tax 
specialists (Picciotto, 2015).  
In this sense, I suggest that regulation has become the tribute that corporate capitalism has 
been obliged to pay for continuing to maintain the private forms which allow its domination 
by a tiny elite, creaming off enormous wealth. This places a significant responsibility on 
theorists as well as practitioners of regulation. The field is defined by reliance on technical 
expertise and independence from politics, in the narrow sense. Yet, as seen in section 3 
above, social, economic and even moral issues are present even in the intricacies of the 
technical and scientific debates on which regulation is based. The best of the critical 
academic work on regulation, some of which has been discussed here, has brought out some 
of these important issues. However, such critical perspectives have made less impact on 
regulatory policies and practices. This is perhaps attributable to the pressures towards 
creation of an epistemological consensus based on orthodoxy in the professional fields 
involved. The result tends to be that researchers with a critical perspective prefer to keep their 
distance from practice and retreat into academicism, while those contributing to policy and 
practice lose their critical edge in the seductions of attracting research grants and publishing 
refereed papers. This creates a dilemma for researchers, but one which is unavoidable, since 
even academic research into regulation contributes to its formation as a field of expertise, 
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 It began as Lettre de la Régulation in 1990; for an outline of the approach see Boyer, 1990. 
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 An interesting attempt to integrate the Anglo-American and French approaches was Pearce and Snider, 1995. 
3
 The untimely death of this incisive young scholar was a great loss to critical socio-legal studies of law and 
regulation in economic development.  
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 These traditions of public economic law, as well as the prevalence of ordoliberalism in Germany and étatisme 
in France, perhaps explain why regulation did not emerge there as a distinct field in the same way as in the 
Anglosphere. 
5
 Work in this journal along these lines includes Gill, 2002; Chunn & Gavigan, 2004; Lippert, 2009; Bradley 
and Szablewska, 2016.  
6
 In the US, since 1975, institutional investors have been required to invest in assets given a high grade by a 
recognised rating agency, of which there have mostly been only three (White, 2009: 392). The Basel II Capital 
Standards Framework gave responsibility to national regulators for recognition of `external credit assessment 
institutions’, and its capital requirements were dependent on the ratings given by these firms. 
7
 Between 2009-2015 financial firms paid some EUR 200b in fines and penalties for various offences (ESRB, 
2015: 12); although a few individuals have been prosecuted, most have been shielded by their firms (Drucker, 
2015), except for those accused of betraying confidentiality such as Bradley Birkenfeld and Rudolf Elmer. A 
report by the European Systemic Risk Board pointed out that while misconduct at banks imposes social costs, ‘it 
may damage confidence in the financial system, which ... is a vital element for the proper functioning of the 
system’. Hence. although ‘it should be prevented by all means and firmly condemned’ and ‘financial and other 
penalties applied in misconduct cases rightly serve as a correcting mechanism’ ‘they may themselves entail 
systemic risks that could impose costs on users of the financial system’ (ESRB, 2015: 3). Hence, it 
recommended that misconduct risk should be built into the stress tests which evaluate whether banks are 
adequately capitalised. thus enabling them to bear the costs of such misconduct. 
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 This concept, extending the notion of regulatory capture, has been applied by financial economist Willem 
Buiter to explain the regulatory decisions of the US Federal Reserve: ‘the Fed listens to Wall Street, and 
believes what it hears’ (Buiter, 2008: 104). It has also been aptly applied to the regulatory framework for 
taxation of transnational corporations based on the dysfunctional ‘arm’s length’ principle (Langbein, 2010). 
9
 For example, the US in 1995 complained under World Trade Organisation non-discrimination rules against 
Korea’s consumer protection regulations, which laid down specified shelf-lives for food products. Even though 
they applied equally to all manufacturers, from the US perspective they acted as a barrier to market access, 
preventing foreign suppliers from using superior preservation technology; following consultations, Korea agreed 
to change its regulations to allow manufacturer-determined shelf lives. 
10
 I have explored elsewhere my personal attempts to manage this dilemma (Picciotto, 2016). 
